

Everything you always wanted to know
about investing ...

... but were afraid to ask your banker



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Everything you always wanted to know about investing ...

... but were afraid to ask your banker

FOUR PRINCIPLES OF SOUND INVESTING

1. There is no safe investment

2. It is impossible to predict future investment returns

3. Active investment management reduces long-term performance

4. The best way to invest is total diversification with fixed allocation

Appendix An investment fund based on the principles of sound investing

The notion of safe investments has powerful supporters


STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING SAFETY OF INVESTMENTS

INVESTMENT	SAFE?
GOVERNMENT BONDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Though a truly risk-free asset exists only in theory, in practice most professionals and academics use short-dated government bonds.” (<i>wikinest.com</i>)• “Both [current European banking regulation and plans to implement Basel III in the EU] treat government bonds of member states as risk-free, highly liquid assets and exclude them from capital requirements and large exposure regimes.” (<i>DIW Berlin, October 2012</i>)
BANK DEPOSITS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• “We want to tell savers that their deposits are safe.” (<i>Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, 5.10.2008</i>)• The “Central Bank of Cyprus wishes to stress that any action aimed at reducing, depriving or restricting the property rights of depositors, contradicts ... the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and ... the European Convention of Human Rights ... Hence, any suggestion to the contrary is not only legally unfounded but it cannot merit serious consideration.” (<i>Central Bank of Cyprus, 11.2.2013, six weeks before bank deposits were partially confiscated</i>)
CASH	“We can be proud to have a stable and credible currency . There is no crisis of the euro. Instead, what we are currently observing in parts of the euro area is first and foremost a fiscal crisis.” (<i>Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB President 2003-11, 15.5.2011</i>)
REAL ESTATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• “We’ve never had a decline in house prices on a national basis. So, what I think what is most likely to happen is that house prices will slow, maybe stabilize.” (<i>Ben Bernanke, FED Chairman 2006-13, in July 2005, one year before house prices started declining by 30%</i>)• “Nobody ever lost from investing in real estate.” (<i>Greek folk wisdom widely believed until 2009</i>)

Most countries have defaulted or restructured their debt at least once

NUMBER OF DEFAULTS OR RESTRUCTURINGS OF PUBLIC DEBT (EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC)

Until 2008




Source: Reinhart/Rogoff (2009, chapters 6,7); own research and calculations

* Domestic debt only ** Currency reform

Strong growth in government debt makes future defaults more likely

OECD GENERAL GOVERNMENT GROSS FINANCIAL LIABILITIES

In % of nominal GDP




Source: OECD Economic Outlook database

Even the most solvent countries suffer regular banking crises

AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS BETWEEN BANKING CRISES*

From 1800 or independence until 2008

SAME SAMPLE AS DEFAULT DATA




Source: Reinhart/Rogoff (2009, appendix A.3); own calculations

* Involving bank runs or closure, merging, takeover or large-scale government assistance of important financial institutions (RR, p. 10)

Only a small fraction of deposits is covered by cash

CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET EU BANKS

In trn EUR



Source: ECB Consolidated Banking Data 2008-2012

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All countries have suffered high inflation in the past

MAXIMUM ANNUAL INFLATION (COUNTRY, YEAR)

HYPERINFLATION

< 10%	10 - 20%	20 - 40%	40 - 80%	80 - 200%	200 - 500%	> 500%
Panama (1974) New Zealand (1980)	Netherlands (1918) Hong Kong (1949) Malaysia (1950) Singapore (1973) Canada (1917) United States (1864) Switzerland (1918) Côte d'Ivoire (1994) Central African Republic (1971) Taiwan (1973) El Salvador (1986) Sri Lanka (1948) Mauritius (1980) Honduras (1991) United Kingdom (1800) South Africa (1919) Sweden (1918)	Egypt (1941) Guatemala (1990) Kenya (1993) Denmark (1800) Belgium (1812) Dominican Republic (2004) Colombia (1802) India (1943) Australia (1854) Morocco (1947) Myanmar (2002) Algeria (1947) Tunisia (1943) Nigeria (1995) France (1946) Thailand (1919)	Portugal (1808) Iceland (1983) Costa Rica (1982) Ecuador (2000) Venezuela (1996) Spain (1808) Uruguay (1990) Turkey (1942) Ghana (1983) Mexico (1987) Paraguay (1952) Philippines (1943) Norway (1812) Zambia (1993)	Korea (1951) Finland (1918) Chile (1973) Italy (1944)	Japan (1945) Indonesia (1966) China (1947) Austria (1922) Brazil (1990) Argentina (1989) Angola (1996) Peru (1990) Bolivia (1985) Nicaragua (1987) Russia (1923) Poland (1923) Greece (1944) Germany (1923) Zimbabwe (2008) Hungary (1946)	

PAPER MONEY LOSES ITS
VALUE THROUGH INFLATION

Source: Reinhart/Rogoff (2009, chapter 12)


In the stable post-war period, all countries experienced significant inflation

AVERAGE ANNUAL INFLATION 1951 – 2010 BY COUNTRY

0 - 2%	2 - 4%	4 - 6%	6 - 8%	8 - 12%	12 - 20%	20 - 40%	> 40%
	Panama Switzerland Malaysia Belgium Luxembourg Japan Netherlands Austria United States Canada	Germany Thailand Tunisia Morocco France Denmark Norway United Kingdom Sweden Australia Finland New Zealand Italy	Mauritius India Spain El Salvador Guatemala Sri Lanka Hungary Egypt Portugal South Africa Honduras Philippines	Greece Kenya Dominican Republic Costa Rica Myanmar	Columbia Paraguay Iceland Venezuela Ecuador Mexico Poland	Zambia Ghana Turkey Indonesia Chile Uruguay	Bolivia Peru Nicaragua Argentina Brazil

PURCHASING POWER AFTER 60 YEARS (1951 – 2010)

30 - 100%




Source: Reinhart/Rogoff database; own calculations

Even the most stable currencies lost at least 80% of their purchasing power

PURCHASING POWER 1950 - 2010

1950 = 100



PAPER MONEY LOSES ITS
VALUE THROUGH INFLATION

"All governments are firmly committed to the policy of **low interest rates, credit expansion and inflation.**"
Ludwig von Mises,
Human Action
(1949)


- Switzerland
- United States
- Germany
- United Kingdom
- Spain
- Greece

Source: Reinhart/Rogoff database; own calculations

Strong growth of monetary aggregates makes future inflation more likely

ECB MONETARY AGGREGATES AND EUROZONE NOMINAL GDP 1995-2012

In trn EUR




Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse

* With maturity up to 2 years or redeemable at notice up to 3 months ** Up to 2 years

Most countries have experienced at least one real estate crash since 1980

GREATEST NOMINAL DECLINES IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE AFTER 1980**



Source: BIS Property Price Statistics


* Major city

** Subject to data availability - only countries with data for at least 7 years included

German real estate bought at reunification did not preserve its real value

NOMINAL AND REAL PRICES FOR GERMAN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE

Real estate index 1990 = 100; nominal and real in 1990 prices




Source: Deutsche Bundesbank with data provided by Bulwien Gesa AG; own calculations

Over the same period, stocks and gold achieved real gains

NOMINAL AND REAL PRICES FOR GERMAN REAL ESTATE, STOCKS, GOLD AND CASH

Index 1990 = 100; nominal and real in 1990 prices



Source: Deutsche Bundesbank with data provided by Bulwien Gesa AG; own calculations

CONCLUSION: FIRST PRINCIPLE OF SOUND INVESTING

THERE IS NO SAFE INVESTMENT

Government bonds may not be paid back as promised

Bank deposits may not be paid back as promised

Paper money loses its value through inflation

Real estate values may suffer enormous declines

“There is no such thing as a perfectly safe investment...

A radical change in conditions may render bad even investments commonly considered perfectly safe.”

Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (1949)

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FOUR PRINCIPLES OF SOUND INVESTING

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
4. The best way to invest is total diversification with fixed allocation

Appendix An investment fund based on the principles of sound investing

Economic forecasts beyond one year seem to have little predictive value


EUROZONE REAL GDP GROWTH FORECASTS VS. ACTUAL GROWTH

In %



ABSOLUTE FORECASTING ERROR EU VS. NAIVE PREDICTION (AVERAGE OF LAST 3 YEARS)

In %-points



Source: European Commission


* Average of last 3 years before previous

** Average of last 3 years before current

German bankers cannot predict the return of German stocks

AVERAGE FORECAST VS. ACTUAL ANNUAL RETURN OF GERMAN STOCKS

Change of DAX index in %



IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT INVESTMENT RETURNS

Right direction?	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓
Right magnitude? (+/- 10%)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗

Only 1 out of 6 negative returns predicted

Only 4 out of 20 returns predicted with <10% error


Source: Handelsblatt; own calculations

* About 40 banks operating in Germany, including Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Société Générale, UBS, Unicredit

They cannot predict the US dollar exchange rate either

AVERAGE FORECAST VS. ACTUAL ANNUAL CHANGE IN DM/EURO-USD EXCHANGE RATE

In %



IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT INVESTMENT RETURNS

Right direction?	(✓)	X	X	(✓)	(✓)	(✓)	X	X	X	(✓)	(✓)	X	(✓)	(✓)	X	(✓)	X	X	X	(✓)
Right magnitude? (+/- 5%)	(✓)	X	X	(✓)	X	(✓)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(✓)	X	X	(✓)	(✓)

10 out of 20 directions correct (same as coin)

Only 6 out of 20 changes predicted with <5% error


Source: Handelsblatt; own calculations

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German bankers cannot predict the yield of German government bonds

AVERAGE FORECAST VS. ACTUAL ANNUAL CHANGE IN TEN-YEAR BUND YIELDS

In %



Right direction?	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
Right magnitude? (+/- 10%)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗

6 out of 20 directions correct (worse than coin)

Only 4 out of 20 changes predicted with <10% error

Source: Handelsblatt; own calculations

* About 40 banks operating in Germany, including Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Société Générale, UBS, Unicredit


Recommendations by stock analysts have no predictive value

STOCK PERFORMANCE MINUS INDEX PERFORMANCE* AFTER 1, 3 AND 6 MONTHS


In %

SAMPLE

- 1.018 stock recommendations
- by 125 stock analysts (banks)
- covering 574 public companies
- in 35 markets (stock indices)
- published between 17.12. and 31.12.2012 on onvista.de



SHARE OF OUT-PERFORMERS
in % of recommendations




Source: Onvista.de, other investment sites; own calculations

* Change of stock price (%) – change of stockmarket price index (%)

Experts often display the same pro-cyclical behavior as private investors

STOCK PERFORMANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS SAIPEM S.P.A. 1.10.2012 -30.9.2013

Relative performance vs. MBI index; 1.10.2012 = 100



Source: onvista.de, ariva.de; own calculations

CONCLUSION: SECOND PRINCIPLE OF SOUND INVESTING

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT INVESTMENT RETURNS

1. Economic forecasts beyond one year have little predictive value
2. Bankers cannot predict stock returns, exchange rates, or bond yields
3. Recommendations by stock analysts do not predict performance
4. Experts often show the same pro-cyclical behavior as small investors

“If the future were merely a continuation of the trends that prevailed in the past, it would not be uncertain ... But as this is not the case, what is called economic forecasting is merely guesswork.”

Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (1949)

“Financial forecasting appears to be a science that makes astrology look respectable... Security analysts have enormous difficulty in ... forecasting earning prospects for the companies they follow.”

Burton Malkiel, *A Random Walk Down Wall Street* (1973)

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FOUR PRINCIPLES OF SOUND INVESTING


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Appendix An investment fund based on the principles of sound investing

Most investment funds perform worse than the market index

TOTAL RETURN EQUITY FUNDS EUROPE 2005-2012

In % p.a.




Source: Morningstar Germany

Outperformance in the past does not indicate better future performance

FUND RETURN MINUS INDEX RETURN (EQUITY FUNDS EUROPE)

In % points p.a.




Source: Morningstar Germany

More and more investors choose passively managed index funds

BREAKDOWN OF EQUITY FUND ASSETS IN EUROPE

In %



Source: Lipper European Fund Market Review 2012 edition, p. 8

* Traditional index tracking funds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)

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
Dynamic asset allocation may generate inferior long-term returns

TOTAL PERFORMANCE DYNAMIC VS. STATIC ASSET ALLOCATION


In %

MAJOR GERMAN BANK'S GLOBAL INVESTMENT COMMITTEE (GIC)

DYNAMIC ASSET ALLOCATION OF THE GIC MODEL PORTFOLIO



TOTAL PERFORMANCE 11.1.2011 – 24.9.2013 (in %)



Source: Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management Investment Insights (various issues); onvista.de

Matthias Kelm, Ph.D., Independent Economic Advisor, Tareno (Luxembourg) S.A.

CONCLUSION: THIRD PRINCIPLE OF SOUND INVESTING

ACTIVE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REDUCES LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE

1. Most investment funds perform worse than the market index
2. Outperformance in the past is no indication for superior performance in the future
3. More and more investors choose passively managed index funds
4. Dynamic asset allocation may generate inferior long-term returns

A “major industry appears to be built largely on an *illusion of skill*... Professional investors, including fund managers, fail a basic test of skill: persistent achievement.”
Daniel Kahnemann (Nobel Prize in Economics 2002), *Thinking, Fast and Slow*


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FOUR PRINCIPLES OF SOUND INVESTING	
1.	There is no safe investment
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Appendix	An investment fund based on the principles of sound investing

As no investment is safe, the only way to reduce risk is total diversification


DIMENSIONS OF TOTAL DIVERSIFICATION



Portfolio rebalancing with a fixed allocation means buying low and selling high

REBALANCING EXAMPLE (1/2)

Portfolio value (31.12.2005 = 100)




Source: Tareno (Luxembourg) S.A.

Portfolio rebalancing with a fixed allocation can generate higher returns

REBALANCING EXAMPLE (2/2)

Growth of portfolio value (31.12.2005 = 100)



BENEFITS OF REBALANCING ARE EVEN GREATER


- with **more asset classes**
- with timing not at fixed intervals (e.g. annually), but after attainment of certain **thresholds** (e.g. 20% change in asset class target allocation)

Source: Tareno (Luxembourg) S.A.

Flexible allocation seems to lower the return of managed ETF portfolios

RETURN OF MIXED INDEX PORTFOLIOS (75% EQUITIES/25% BONDS)* 2009-2012

In % p.a.




* With Morningstar benchmark 25% Barclays Eur Agg TR & 75% FTSE World TR ** With annual rebalancing
 *** Client portfolio with fixed allocation managed by MK

Source: Morningstar Germany, Tareno (Luxembourg) S.A.

A sound investment manager performs three specific tasks

TASKS OF INVESTMENT MANAGER APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF SOUND INVESTING



* Maximum one asset class per 100.000 € to limit transaction costs

** E.g. dissolution of euro area, reintroduction of gold standard, abolishment of market economy in specific countries etc.

CONCLUSION: FOURTH PRINCIPLE OF SOUND INVESTING

THE BEST WAY TO INVEST IS TOTAL DIVERSIFICATION WITH FIXED ALLOCATION

1. The only way to reduce risk is total diversification
2. Portfolio rebalancing with a fixed allocation means buying low and selling high
3. Portfolio rebalancing with a fixed allocation can generate higher returns
4. Flexible allocation seems to lower the return of managed ETF portfolios
5. A sound investment manager maintains a diversified fixed allocation of index funds

“Since the future cannot be predicted, it is impossible to specify in advance what the best asset allocation will be. Rather, our job is to find **an allocation that will do reasonably well under a wide range of circumstances...** Sticking by your target asset allocation through thick and thin is much more important than picking the right asset allocation.”

William Bernstein, *The Intelligent Asset Allocator* (2001)

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Initial diversification by three basic asset classes


RIGOROUS DIVERSIFICATION (STEP 1/5)

3 ASSET CLASSES

TARENO DIVERSIFIED INDEX INVESTING - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS

REAL ASSETS

- **High individual risk**, but
- **Lower portfolio risk** (low correlation with equities)
- **Best inflation hedge**



BONDS

- **Lower portfolio risk** (low correlation with equities)
- Best deflation hedge (but **vulnerable to inflation**)

EQUITIES


- **Highest long-term returns** (but **highest short-term risk**)
- Partial inflation hedge

Further diversification by geography, currency, and real asset category

RIGOROUS DIVERSIFICATION (STEP 2/5)

10 ASSET CLASSES

TARENO DIVERSIFIED INDEX INVESTING - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS




Further diversification by development level, duration, and credit risk

RIGOROUS DIVERSIFICATION (STEP 3/5)

21 ASSET CLASSES

TARENO DIVERSIFIED INDEX INVESTING - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS

REAL ASSETS




BONDS

Detailed diversification of equities by style, of real assets by type

RIGOROUS DIVERSIFICATION (STEP 4/5)

45 ASSET CLASSES


TARENO DIVERSIFIED INDEX INVESTING - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS



Implementation of fixed allocation with physically replicating index funds

RIGOROUS DIVERSIFICATION (STEP 5/5 – FUND SELECTION BY COMPANY)


TARENO DIVERSIFIED INDEX INVESTING - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS



Fixed DII allocation would have outperformed 95% of all global mixed funds

BACK TESTING TARENO DII - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS 2006-2013

GROWTH OF FUND VALUE (31.12.2005 = 100)



Source: Morningstar Germany

* With annual rebalancing and TER 1,4%

** 50/50 and 75/25 FTSE Wld TR & Barclays EurAgg TR

CONCLUSION: A FUND BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SOUND INVESTING

TARENO DIVERSIFIED INDEX INVESTING - EQUITIES, BONDS, REAL ASSETS

1. Rigorous diversification among 45 classes of equities, bonds, and real assets
 - Superior long-term returns through focus on global equities (1/2 of portfolio)
 - Reduction of portfolio risk through global bonds and precious metals (3/8 of portfolio)
 - Reduction of inflation risk through real assets (1/4 of portfolio)
2. Investment only in physically replicating, low-cost index funds by leading providers
3. Management with low transaction costs, based on fixed allocation with rebalancing
4. Better long-term performance than most flexible funds (confirmed by back testing)
5. Competitive management fee of 0,9% p.a. (in share class A with €50.000 minimum*)

RIGOROUS DIVERSIFICATION - WITHOUT ACTIVE SPECULATION